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[L. A. No. 18968. In Bank. Dee. 5, 1944.] 
LILLIAN CANDACE HOUSE, Appellant, v. LOS AN-
GELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
[1] Eminent Domain - Police Power Distinguished. - While the 
police power is very broad in concept, it is Dot without re-
striction in relation to the taking 01" damaging of property. 
[1] See 10 OaLJur. 283; 18 Am.Jur. 639. 




Dec. 1944 j nOUSE 11. L. A. COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DlST. 385' 
[25 C.2d 384; 153 P.2d 950] 
----------------
When it passes beyond proper bounds in its invasion of prop-
erty rights, it comes within the purview of the law of eminent 
domain and it~ e:x-erci!le requires compensation. 
[2a-2c] Waters - Flood Control Districts - Liability for Flood 
Damage.-A flood control district may not escape liability for 
flood dama~e on any theory of e~erci!;jng a riparian tight if 
it has removed safe an,d secure 'protection immedilltely adja-
cent to the owner's land and substituted therefor an unsafe. 
careless and negligently planned bank or wall, resulting in the 
overflow, inundating ,and washing away of her' property. and 
a complaint so alleging states a cause of action within Con!lt., 
art I, § 14. 
[8) Eminent Domain - Police Power Distinguished. - A govern-
mental agency proceeding with work on a public improvement, 
undertaken in the exercise of the police power, may not need-
lessly inflict injury on private property without bein~ liahle 
to make compensation therefor. This principle accords with 
the general object of the constitutional guaranties in protec-
tion of property ri/!,hts, and places on a reciprocal basis the 
individual's damage in relation to the public benefit. 
[4] ld.-Police Power Distinguished.-Under the pressure of public 
necessity and to avert impending peril. the le¢timate exercise 
of the police power often works not only avoidable damage bllt 
destruction of property without calling for compensation. 
and in such cases the emergency constitutes full justification 
for the measures taken to control the menacing condition. 
[5] Waters - Flood Control Districts - Liability - Damage from 
Construction of lmprovement.-While mere errors of judgment. 
in planning and constructing a public work, such as flood con-
trol work, may be consistent with reasonable care, a procedure 
so grossly incompetent and contrary to "good engineerin/!, 
practices" as to constitute negligence may give the injured 
property owner just cause' for complaint on the ground that 
the governmental agency responsible for the project has trans-
gressed the limits of the police power. Such conclusion does 
not make the public agency an insurer against all possible 
damage which thereby might be inflicted on private property, 
but merely requires that the damage to the individual not 
exceed the neeessities of the particular case. ' 
[6] Eminent Domain - Pollee Power Distinguisbed.-In view of 
the organic rights to acquire, possess and prote"t property, 
and to due process and equal protection of the law.s, the prin-
ciples of non liability and damnftm absque injuria are not ap-
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plicable when, in the excrcil;e of the police power, personal 
and property rights are interfrred with or impaired in a man-
ner or to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to serve 
a public purpose' for the g"e'nrraJ welfare. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, Judge. Reversed. 
Action against flood control district for damages for in-
juries to land as a result of flooding. Judgment of dismissal 
after sustaining demurrer to complaint without leave to 
amend, reversed. 
Henry M. Lee for Appellant. 
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, and S. V. O. Prichard, 
Assistant County Counsel, for Respondent. 
CURTIN, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment of dis-
missal entered after the trial court had sustained a demurrer 
to the plaintiff's first amended complaint without leave to 
amend. 
The plaintiff, as the owner of certain land in Los Angeles 
County adjacent to the Los AngeleS River, undertakes to state ' 
a cause of action based upon damages to her property by 
reason of the negligence of the defendant district in its plan-
ning, construction and maintenance of certain flood control 
channel work in said river. She rests her right of recovery 
upon article I, section 14, of the state Constitution, which 
provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation to the owner. The 
trial court erred in failing to sustain the constitutional basis 
of the plaintiff's claim under the distinguishable concept of 
her pleading. 
As appears from the amended complaint, the gist of the 
plaintiff's case is as follows: In pursuance of its plan for 
flood control, the Los Angeles County Flood Control District 
removed permeable dikes, piling, wire mesh and groins that 
bordered the Los Angeles River adjacent to the plaintiff's 
land and replaced these installations with levees. The effect 
of the dikes and other obstructions had been to reduce the 
high velocity of the river waters in flood season by permitting 
~ to spread over an extensive overflow area, leaving & de- . 
./ 
) 
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posit of silt thereon. Upon the removal of these protective 
structures and the substitution of the levees along the river 
banks, the regimen of the stream \vas completely changed in 
that there was no provision for overflow spread on adjoining 
lands, with the result that the waters were confined to a 
smaller area and their velocity was greatly increased. The 
plaintiff charges the dcfenoant district with negligence in 
these principal particulars in the planning and erection of 
the newly installed flood control works: (1) in failing to make 
the artificial river channel of sufficient size to accommodate 
the augmented volume of waters in flood seasonj and (2) in 
building the levees of improper materials-sand and gravel 
upon which were piled small stone blocks of inadequate size, 
without being bonded together with cement, grout or other 
substance-so that they were unable to withstand the erosive 
force of the river waters. The plaintiff then alleges that as 
the proximate result of these negligent acts, the storm waters 
flowing in the Los Angeles River on March 2, 3 and 4, 1938, 
broke through the levees and burst with great violence upon 
her adjacent land, denuding it of its soil to a depth of from 
six to ten feet and washing away all the improvements situate 
thereon, to her damage in the sum of $30,663. The plaintiff 
further avers that the defendant district's undertaking of 
such public improvement work was not occasioned by such im-
minent peril or emergency in relation to the general welfare 
as would excuse it from taking proper measures in the course 
of construction-during the years of 1935, 1936 and 1937-to 
safeguard her property from the danger attendant upon its 
pursuit of a flood control plan contrary to good engineering 
practices, and its installation and maintenance of defective 
structures following the removal of the protective agencies 
that had theretofore existed along the river banks. In this 
connection the plainti1r allgees that she suffered no damage to 
her property during the great flood of the Los Angeles River 
in January, 1934. 
It would serve no useful purpose to engage here in a de-
tailed discussion of the opposing arguments as to whether 
under the above mentioned constitutional provision a public 
agency in the installation of river channel improvements is 
generally liable to the property owner for overflow damage 
incident to th~ exercise of such governmental function. The 
divergent views on that unqualified proposition were fully 
) 
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reviewed by this court recently ill the cases of Archer v. City 
of Los Angcles (1941), 19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d ] 1 and O'JIara 
v. Los Angeles C01infy Flood Control Dist. (1941). I!) Ca1.2d 
61 [119 P.2d 23J. While the latter case involved the same 
flood control project as is now subject of complnint and under 
the prevailing view there, the varying claims of damage were 
held to be noncompensable upon distinguishable theories, the 
liability feature here arises under a different aspect. By her 
pleading the plaintiff advances, in the nature of a limitation i 
upon a public agency's performance of its governmental func-
tion, the charge of negligence. an added feature which did not 
enter into the O'Hara decision. Accepting the premise of argu-
ment of the parties here t.hat a levee improvement made in 
the channel of a stream for the general welfare is referable 
to the police power, the propriety of its exercise must still 
be considered under the distinct circumstances presented. 
[1] While the police power is very broad in concept, it is not 
without restriction in relation to the taking or damaging of 
property. When it passes beyond proper bounds in its in-
vasion of property rights, it in effect comes within the purview 
of the law of eminent domain Ilnd its exercise requires com-
pensation. (Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318 [100 P. 
867, 132 Am.St.Rep. 88, 2] L.R.A.N.S. 741]; Pacific Tele-
phone etc. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640 [137 P. 1119. Ann. 
Cas. 1915C 822, 50 L.R.A.N.S. 652],) In fact, on the point 
of· a governmental agency's liability for damages arising in 
connection with its undertaking construction work, the pre-
vailing opinion in the Archer case, supra, does not purport to 
dispute the settled principle that public necessity limits the 
right to exact uncompensated submission from the property 
owner if his property be either damaged, taken or destroyed. 
Rather it is expressly stated there in the prevailing opinion 
(19 Ca1.2d 23-24): "The state or its subdivisions ma~' take 
or damage private property without compensation if such 
action is essential to safeguard public health, safety or morals. 
[citing authorities.] In certain circumstances, however, the 
taking or damaging of private property for such a purpose is 
not prompted by so great a necessity as to be iustified without 
proper compensation to the owner. [citing authorities.]" 
(Italics added.) Thus there is recognized the incontest-
able proposition that the exercise of the police power, though 
an essential attribute of sovereignty for the public welfare 
) 
/ 
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and arbitrary in its nature, cannot extend beyond the neces-
sities of the case and be made a cloak to destroy constitutional 
rights as to the inviolateness of private property. 
A case closely in point here is Pacific Seaside Home v. New-
bert P. District, 190 Cal. 544 [213 P. 967], where the suffi-
ciency of the plaintiti's pleading was likewise under attack. 
There this court said at pages 545-546: " .•• The defendant 
was a pubiic corporation . • . entitled to maintain and de-
fend actions in law and in equity ... and would be liable 
for the negligent diversion of storm waters upon the plain-
titi's property. (Elliott v. County of Los A11geles, 183 Cal. 
472, 475 [191 P.899].) The gist of the pla.intiff's complaint 
is that the defendant const"ucted channels for the water of 
the Santa Ana River so defectively and negligently that they 
would not carry the waters of the stream. Plaintiff alleges that 
'had the defendant not changed the natural course of the 
Santa Ana River, or in anywise interfered with its natural 
flow, the waters of the Santa Ana River would have flowed on 
into Newport Bay and no damage would have accrued to the 
plaintiti had the said river been permitted to flow as it nat-
urally would had not the defendant constructed its channel 
to divert the same .•. .' It is further alleged in effect that 
the injury occurred to the plaintiff by reason of the fact that 
the defendant negligently turned the waters of the Santa .Ana 
River in a channel which was too small, and which was negli-
gently constructed and maintained, and that by reaSOn thereof 
it was damaged. 
"These facts sufficiently state a cause of action." (Italics 
added.) 
The Elliott and Pacific Seaside Home eases were cited as 
the basis for upholding the sufficiency of the plaintitis' com-
plaint against a general demurrer in the first appellate consid-
eration of the damage cl~im presented in Archer v. City of Los 
Angeles, 15 Cal.App.2d 520 [59 P.2d 605]. The pleading was 
described by the District Court of Appeal as follows at pages 
521-522: "The gist of [the] ••• complaint .•• is that re-
spondent constructed and built an artificial drainage system 
so defectively, carelessly and negligently that it would not 
carry the storm waters to- the Pacific Ocean as designed and 
intended" and "that the injury to the appellants occurred by 
reason of the fact that respondent negligently turned the 
storm waters into La Ballona lagoon, which was too small to 
... 
J 
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conduct the water turned into it hy and througlJ the draina;!:p. 
system constructed, operated and maintained b;r respOIHlent . 
. . . " Suhsequently, the Arrher damage action was before 
this court for decision upon the appeal from the juugmcnt of 
nonsuit entered at the close of the jJlaint itTs' evidence at the 
trial. (Archer v. City of Lo:~ Angeles, S1lpra, 19 Ca1.2d 19.) 
In the prevailing opinion affirming the judgment, the follow. 
ing distinction. after quotation of the ahove portion of the 
decision of tIle District Court of Appcal on demurrer, was 
made at page 29: "According to the allegations of the com-
plaint, the damagc resulted because defendants negligently 
diverted water out of its natural channel, and obstructed the 
channel of the creek. Plaintiffs' evidence, however, fails to 
subst.antiate such allegations. 1'he decision of the District 
Court of Appeal on demurrer is therefore not binding on this 
court in passing on the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the allegations." (Italics added.) Measured by its own 
limitation, such language, denoting the deficiency in the plain-
tiffs' establishment of their case, does not mean that a gov-
ernmental agency in the installation of stream improvements 
may escape liability under the constitutional compensation 
requirement where the property owner sustaining damage 
from such work proves, in accordance with his allegations, 
negligence in the construction and maintenance of the public 
project. Under the accepted circumstances there, the prevail-
ing opinion in the Archer case applied the doctrine of damnum 
absque injuria by declaring that the governmental agency was 
exercising a riparian right so that it would be no more liable 
to a lower property owner damaged thereby than would a 
private person inflicting a like injury in protection of his 
upper lands. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 24; 
cf. O'Hara v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., supra, 
at p. 63.) 
[2&] In the present case the defendant district may not 
escape liability on any theory of exercising a riparian right, 
for the plaintiff does not correlate her damage claim with any 
such principle. Rather she makes the direct charge that t'fie 
defendant district removed a safe and secure protection to 
her land immediately adjacent thereto and substituted there-
for an unsafe, carelessly and negligently planned bank or wall, 
resulting in the overflow, inundating and washing away of 
her propeny, which had theretofore never been visited bl the 
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river waters. [3] It is a principle of universal law that 
wherever the right to own property is recognized in a free 
government, practically all other rights become worthless if 
the government possesses an uncontrollable power over the 
propcrty of the citizen. Upon this premise the plaintiff relics 
on the unnecessary damage to her property as the result of the 
defendant district's negligence in the planning, construction 
and maintcnance of the flood channel work to sustain the con-
stitutional basis of her claim. In other words, it is her posi-
tion that damage suffered by a property owner as the result 
of a public improvement undertaken in the exercis of the 
police power must have some reasonable relation to the pur-
pose to be accomplished under the prevailing circumstances, 
and that the governmental agency proceeding with such work 
may not needlessly inflict injury upon private property with-
out being liable to make compensation therefor. This accords 
with the general object of the constitutional guaranties in 
protection of property rights and but places upon a reciprocal 
basis the individual's damage in relation to the public benefit. 
Unnecessary damage to his property is of no benefit to the 
public; rather it only entails unwarranted sacrifice and loss 
on the individual's part, which should be compensable damage. 
[4] Unquestionably, under the pressure of public necessity 
and to avert impending peril, the legitimate exercise of the 
police power often works not only avoidable damage but de-
struction of property without calling for compensation. In-
stances of this character are the demolition of all or parts of 
buildings to prevent the spread of conflagration, or the de-
struction of diseased animals, of rotten fruit, or infected 
trees where life or health is jeopardized. In such cases call-
ing for ::nmediate action the emergency constitutes full jus-
tification for the measures taken to control the menacing con-
dition, and private interests must be held wholly subservient 
to the right of the state to proceed in such manner as it deems 
appropriate for the protection of the public health or safety. 
(18 Am.Jur 778; 29 C.J.S. 784.) [2b] But the present 
case does not appear to be one of such emergency character 
as would preclude the defendant district from being held 
liable for unnecessary damage resulting from the alleged in-
adequate and negligent planning, construction and mainte-
nance of its flood channel project. According to the plain-
til1"s pleading, the defendant district, with time to exercise 
a deliberate choice of action in the manner of its installation 
) 
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of the river improvements, followed a plan "inherently 
wrong" and then'by caused needless damage to lier property. 
_.[5] While mere errors of judgment in planning and· con-
structing a public work may be consistent with reasonable 
care, procedure so grossly incompetent and contrary to "good 
engineering practices" as to constitute negligence may well 
g-ive the injured property owner just cause for complaint 
upon the ground that the governmental agency responsible 
for the project has transgressed the limits of the police power. ! 
(Kaufman v. Tomich, 208 Cal. 19 [280 P. 130].) Such con-
clusion does not make the public agency, in undertaking its 
flood control program, an insurer against all possible damage 
which thereby might be inflicted on private property (cf. 
United States v. Sponenoarger, 308 U.S. 256 [60 S.Ct. 225, 
84 L.Ed.230], but it merely requires that the damage to the 
individual, on whom the sovereign power justifiably makes 
demands in the public interest, not exceed the necessities of-
the particular case due to a failure to use reasonable care I 
and diligence. [6] In view of the organic rights to acquire, 
possess and protect property and to due process and equal 
protection of the laws, the principles of nonliability and 
damnum absque injuria are not applicable when, in the exer-
cise of the police power, private, personal and property rights 
are interfered with, injured or impaired in a manner or by 
a means, or to an extent that is not reasonably necessary to 
serve a public purpose for the general welfare. (Pennsyl-
vania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 [43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 
322] ; cited with approval in Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 
supra, at p. 24.) 
[2c] For the foregoing reasons the defendant district's 
exercise of the police power does not of itself furnish com-
plete justification for the infliction of damage upon the plain-
tiff's property without liability fOJ compensation. Under the 
theory of her pleading, the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient 
to constitute a cause of action within the scope of article I, 
section 14. of the state Constitution, and it was prror for the 
trial court to rule otherwise. The judgment of dismissal is 
therefore reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Shenk, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the foregoing judgment and 
opinion. The distinction made in the opinion between this 
) 
) 
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case and the cases of Archer v. City of Los Angeles (1941), 
19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d 1], and O'Hara v. Dos Angeles County 
Flood Control Dist. (1941),19 Ca1.2d 61 [119 P.2d 23], seems 
tenable, but by my concurrence herein I do not imply accord 
with the majority views expressed in those cases. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. Since this is 
an appeal from a judgment following an order sustaining a 
demurrer, the following allegations of the first amended com-
plaint must be regarded as true. The Los Angeles River, 
which becomes a menace to the neighboring property during 
the rainy season because of its violent floods, overflowed 
plaintiff's land during a storm in the first days of March, 
1938, washed out the land to a depth of approximately six to 
ten feet, and destroyed buildings, other improvements, and 
personal property. The injury was caused by a system of 
flood control installed by defendant in the period between 
December, 1935, and the storm. The plaintiff's property would 
have been protected from the flood, as it was in January, 
1934. during an even greater flood, had the defendant not 
replaced the former system of flood control, installed by de-
fendant between 1917 and 1930, with new structures that 
were inadequate for the purpose. The former installations 
consisted of permeable dikes of piling and wire mesh along 
the margin of the river bed through which the waters could 
freely flow into an overflow area on both sides of the river 
channel. These structures and the riparian vegetation re-
duced the "elocity of the flood waters. rendering them less 
dangerous to neighboring property. Groins installed trans-
versely to the overflow area 8('complished the restoration and 
maintenance of the natural condition of the river by causing 
a regrowth of vegetation in the overflow area and the building 
up of that area with silt deposited by the water. The 
new construction work. mainly excavation of the river chan-
nel and installation of levees along its banks, necessitated 
removal of the shrubs and trees along the river. The channel 
was narrowed and its capacity to carry water lowered. while 
the velocity of the water through the channel was increased. 
Since the levees lacked adequate openings to permit the drain-
age waters to flow into the river, the danger to the adjacent 
land from overflowing water was intensified. The levees were 
built several feet above the level of the riparian area and 
were thus exposed to great pressure by the wat.er compressed 
) 
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into the narrowed channel. They were constructed of sand 
and gravel upon which small stone blocks were laid. on the 
inner slopes not bound together with cement or other material. 
AB a consequence of this defective construction of the levees, 
upon which the adjacent land depended for its protection, the 
water could flow through the holes between the stone blocks 
and percolate through the levees. Thus, the invasion of plain. 
tiff's land by the flood water was caused by the defectiveness 
of defendant's structures, which diverted the water out of its 
natural channel onto the plaintiff's land. For the damages 
sustained, plaintiff seeks compensation from defendant under 
article I, section 14 of the California Constitution, providing 
that private property shall "not he taken or damaged for pub-
lic use" without just compensation. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff is seeking to revive an 
issue settled in Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19 
[119 P.2d 1], and in O'Hara v. Los Angeles Oounty Flood 
Oontrol Dist .. 19 Ca1.2d 61 (119 P.2d 23]. The Archer case 
involved the question whether a governmental agency is liable 
under article I. section 14, when improvements constructed 
by it along the natural course of a stream accelerate the flow 
of the water. and lower lands are flooded because of the in-
adequacy, known to the governmental agency, of the outlet 
to accommodate the increased flow. It was held that the 
governmental agency was not liable, since there is no liabil-
ity under the constitutional provision if the property owner 
would have no cause of action were a private person to inflict 
the damage, and there would have been no cause of action 
against a private person for installing improvements in the 
stream accelerating the flow of the water but not diverting 
it out of its channel. (8a.n Gabriel Valley Oountry Club v. 
County otLos Angeles. 182 Cal. 392 [188 P. 554, 9 A.L.R. 
1200].) The O'Hara case involved the same question as the 
Archer case as wen as the question whether a governmental 
agency is liable under thf.' constitutional provision to a prop-
erty owner whose property was damaged by the obstruction 
of the flow of surface water not running in a natural channel 
resulting from an embankment that prevented the drainage 
of surface waters into the river. In reliance on Oorcoran v. 
Oity of Benicia, 96 Cal. 1 [30 P. 798, 31 Am.St.Rep. 171] ; 
Oonniff v. San Francisco, 67 Cal. 45 f7 P. 41] Jefferis v. Oity 
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Lampe v. San Francisco, 12-4 Cal. 546 [57 P. 46~, 1001], it 
was held that in constructing the improvement, the govern-
mental agency could validly exercise its. police power to ob-
struct the flow of surface waters not running in a natural 
channel without making compensation for the resulting dam-
age. The present case differs from the Archer and O'Hara 
cases. In the former there was no evidence that defendants 
negligently diverted water out of its natural channel. and in 
the latter there was no allegation of such diversion. Here 
plaintiff's allegations that the damages to her property were 
caused by diversion of the water of a river out of its natnral 
channel onto her land by means of defective levees causing 
and allowing the water to burst out of its channel onto her 
land must be regarded as true. 
Defendant contends that article I, section 14, is inapplica-
ble upon the grounds that defendant did not deliberately take 
or damage plaintiff's property and did not utilize it for the 
purposes of its public improvements, and that therefore the 
damages--were not sustained for "public use," and were too 
remote in point of· time and foreseeability to be incident to 
defendant's publi(' undertaking. 
Defendant is a public corporation created by an act of the 
Legislature, known as the "Los Angeles Flood Control Act" 
(Stats. 1915, p. 1502, as amended; Deering'S Gen. Laws, Act 
4463), to protect lands, including harborS and public hi~h­
ways from flood waters and to conserve the flood watel'R for 
useful purposes. (§ 2 of the act; Los Angeles County Flood 
Control Dist. v. Hamilton, 177 Cal. 119. 126 [169 P. 1028}.) 
These purposes are essentially public although beneficial to 
many private individual!'! (see Los Angeles v. Los Angeles 
County Flood Control Dist., 11 Ca1.2d 395. 404 [80 P.2d 479]; 
Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Hamt7ton, supra, 
p. 124; Cheseboro v. Los Angeles Cou'n.ty Flood Control Dist., 
306 U.S. 459, 465 r59 S.Ct. 622, 83 L.Ed. 921]; see 29 C.J.S. 
852; 70 A.L.R. 1274), and the Legislature properly vested 
defendant with the power of eminent domain. (§§ 2(6), 16, 
16% of the act.) Property taken or damaged for defendant's 
purposes is therefore "taken or damaged for publie use" in 
the sense of the constitutional provision. In the absence of 
. contract the right to discharge water onto another's property 
may be based on property law or on the police power of the 
state. (Archer v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 24.) If the 
discharging of water incident to the construction of a public 
) 
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impl:ovellleHt cannot be sustained as the exercise of a right, 
it is a taking or damaging within the meaning of the consti-
tutional provision of the property llljured. (Powers [t'aJ'ms 
v. C;onsolidated lrr. Vist., 19 UaUM 123, 126 [119 P.2d 717J; 
Pacific Seai>ide II ome v. N ewbert P. Vist., 190 Cal. 544 l213 P. 
967]; Elliott v. Vounty oj' Los -Angeles, 183 Cal. 472, 475 
[191 P. 899 J; Smith v. Vity of Los Angeles, 66 Ual.App.2d 
562 [153 P.2d 69J; Conniff v. San Fmncisco, 67 Cal. 45, 
48[7 P. 41]; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 l54 
S.Ct. 26, 78 L.Ed. 142]; United States v. Oress, 243 U.S. 316, 
327 [31 S.Ct. 380, 61 L.Ed. 746]; United States v. Lynah, 
188 U.S. 445, 470 [23 S.Ct. 349, 47 L.Ed. 539]; Hur1.ey v. 
Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 [52 S.Ct. 267, 76 L.Ed. 637]; Pum-
pelly v. Green Bay etc. 00.,13 Wall. 166, 177 [20 L.Ed. 557] t 
Eaton v. Boston etc. Railroad, 51 N.H. 504 [12 Am.Rep. 147]; 
see Franklin v. United States, 101 F.2d 459; 128 A.L.R. 
1195.) The destruction or damaging of property is sufficiently 
connected with "public use" as required by the Constitution, 
if the injury is a result of dangers inherent in the construction 
of the public improvement as distinguished from dangers 
arising from the negligent operation of the improvement. 
The construction of the public improvement is a deliberate 
action of the state or its agency iIi furtherance· of public pur-
poses. In erecting a structure that is inherently dangerous 
to private property, the state or its agency undertakes by 
virtue of the constitutional provision to compensate property 
owners for injury to their property arising from the inher-
ent dangers of the public improvement or originating "from 
the wrongful plan or character of the work." (Perkins v. 
Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 789 [127 P. 50]; Kaufman v. Tomich, 
208 Cal. 19, 25 [280 P. 130]; Powers Farms v. Oonsolidated 
Irr. Dist., sup"a, p. 127; Reardon v. San Francisco, 66 Cal. 
492, 505 [6 P. 317, 56 Am.Rep. 109].) This liability is in-
dependent of intention or negligence on the part of the gov-
ernmental agency. (Reardon v. San Francisco, supra, at p. 
505; Tormey v. Anderson-Oottonwood Irr. Dist., 53 Cal.App. 
559 [200 P. 814], opinion of Supreme Court denying a hear-
ing, p. 568; Powers Farms v. Consolidated Irr. Dist., supra, 
p. 126; Mitckell v. City of Santa Barbara, 48 Cal.App.2d 568, 
572 [120 P.2d 131]; Morrison v. Clackamas Oounty, 141 Ore. 
564 [18 P.2d 814]; Hooker v. Farmers' Irr. Dist., 272 F. 600; 
see 10 Cal.Jur. 337; 69 AL.R. 1231.) The decisive consider-
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ation is the effect of the public improvement on the property 
and whether the owner of the damaged property if uncom-
pensated would contribute more than his proper share to the 
public undertaking. It is irrelevant whether or not the in-
jury to the property is accompanied by a corresponding bene-
fit to the public purpose to which the improvement is dedi-
cated, since the measure of liability is not the benefit derived 
from the property, but the loss to' the owner. (Rose v. State 
of California, 19 Ca1.2d 713, 737 [123 P.2d 505]; City of 
Stockton v. Vote, 76 Cal.App. 369, 404~ [244 P. 609]; Santa 
Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 542 [34 P. 224]; City of Redding 
v. Diestelhorst, 15 Cal.App.2d 184, 193 [59 P.2d 177] ; City of 
Pasadena v. Union Trust Co., 138 Ca1.App. 21, 25 [31 P.2d 
463]; Temescal Water Co. v. Marvin, 121 Ca1.App. 512, 521 
[9 P.2d 335J; see 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain § 240 et seq.) 
Defendant, therefore, cannot rely on the fact that the injury 
to the property was caused, not by a deliberate appropria-
tion thereof, but by a collapse of defendant's structures. It is 
of no avail to defendant that the invasion of plaintiff's prop-
erty in the manner in which it happened was not forseeable. 
The provision in article I, section 14, that the compensation 
for the taking or damaging of property shall be paid in ad-
vance protects the interests of the property-owner where ad-
vance payment is feasible under the circumstances; liability 
is not avoided simply because such payment is not feasible. 
The public purpose was not the mere construction of the im-
provement but the protection that it would afford against 
floods. The dangers inherent in the improvement would cause 
injury only when storms put the flood control system to a 
test. The injury sustained by plaintiff was therefore not 
too remote. 
According to the complaint the injury to plaintiff's land 
was caused by direct invasion thereof by water bursting 
through defendant's levees. Compensation for that injury 
is called for under article I, section 14, if the flood waters 
would not have injured her property but for the directing 
of the water out of its channel onto the plaintiff's property 
because of the defectiveness of the levees. By allowing the 
water to leave its channel and to burst onto the plaintiff's 
land, the levees diverted the water out of its natural channel. 
Barring situations of immediate emergency, neither the prop-
erty law nor the police power of the state entitles a govern-
mental agency to divert water out of its natural ehannel onto 
-) 
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private property. (Lat·rabee v. Cloverdale, 131 Cal. 96, 98 
[63 P. 143]; Los Angeles Cem . .I1ssn. v. Los Angeles, 103 Cal. 
461,467 [37 P. 375]; Conniff v. San Francisco, supra, at p. 49, 
see 7 So.Cal.L.Rev. 295.) 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I eon cur in the judgment of reversal but 
I do not agree with that portion of the inajority opinion which 
attempts to distinguish this case from the cases of Archer v. 
City of Los Angeles, 19 Ca1.2d 19 [119 P.2d 1] j and O'Hara 
v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 19 Cal.2d 61 [119 
P .2d 23 J. These last mentioned cases are not distinguishable 
from the case at bar, and in my opinion, the only Bound basis 
upon which the case at bar can be reversed is that stated in 
my dissenting opinions in the above cited cases. In these 
dissenting opinions I pointed out the patent fallacy of the 
theory upon which the majority opinions in those cases was 
based, and Mr. Justice Curtis concurred in those dissenting 
opinions. My opinion in regard to those cases has not changed 
because the views expressed in my dissenting opinions therein 
were and are absolutely· sound. It now appears that a ma-
jority of this court are not satisfied with the conclusion reached 
in the majority opinions in the Archer and O'Hara cases, but 
instead of overruling these cases, they have attempted to dis-
tinguish them from the case at bar. I do not approve of this 
practice as it merely adds to the confusion which already 
exists. However, by limiting the application of the doctrine 
announced in those eases, the majority opinion in the case 
at bar has taken a commendable step, and I trust that the 
time will come in the not distant future when a majority of 
this court will have the wisdom, foresight and courage to take 
the further step and expressly overrule the Archer and O'Hara 
eases and thus remove the injustice and confusion which those 
decisions have brought to the law of this state. 
